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majority	 vote	 Leave.	The	 reasons	behind	 this,	 and	also	 the	potential	 for	a	new	 regional	policy	are	









the	 UK	 had	 spoken.	 However,	 they	 had	 not	 spoken	 with	 one	 voice.	 Indeed,	 the	 territorial	
differentiation	 that	 characterises	 the	 UK’s	 relationship	 with	 the	 EU	 was	 itself	 reflected	 in	 the	









entity.	 However,	 the	 process	 and	 outcome	 of	 these	 negotiations	 will	 play	 out	 on	 multiple	 levels	
across	 the	 UK.	 There	 is,	 after	 all,	 not	 just	 one	 singular	 relationship	 at	 stake	 in	 the	 negotiations.	
Instead,	there	will	be	consequences	for	the	multiple	relationships	that	exist	between	the	EU	and	the	
UK’s	 devolved	 nations,	 relationships	 that	 play	 out	 along	 financial,	 economic,	 legal,	 political	 and	
cultural	lines.	The	UK’s	exit	from	the	EU	will	also	have	knock-on	implications	for	the	future	union	of	




the	First	Minister	of	Wales	announced	his	 ‘deep	disappointment’	with	 the	 referendum	result,	 and	
outlined	the	six	priorities	for	protecting	Welsh	interests	post	Brexit.	First	 is	 job	protection,	and	the	
maintenance	 of	 economic	 confidence	 and	 stability.	 Access	 to	 the	 single	market	 is	 seen	 as	 ‘vital’,1	
along	with	 continued	 participation	 until	 at	 least	 2020	 in	 the	 EU	 funding	 programmes	which	 have	
seen	Wales	as	a	net	beneficiary	of	EU	money.	Looking	ahead,	a	new	financial	settlement	within	the	
UK	 is	 demanded,	 along	with	 the	 placing	 of	 the	Devolved	Administrations	 ‘on	 an	 entirely	 different	












spectre	of	 ‘divisive	nationalism’	 (May,	T.	2016)	 raise	serious	doubts	about	 the	 level	of	 inclusion	of	
the	devolved	nations	 in	 the	negotiating	process,	 as	 does	 the	exclusion	of	 the	 Scottish,	Welsh	 and	













considered	 in	more	 detail	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 before	 a	 final	 section	 looks	 at	 a	 possible	 ‘win’	 for	




In	 some	 ways,	 the	 outcome	 of	 the	 EU	 Referendum	 in	Wales	 was	 not	 surprising,	 being	 as	 it	 was	
broadly	in	line	with	the	polling	data	for	the	couple	of	years	preceding	the	vote	(Scully	2016).	In	other	
ways,	however,	Wales’s	vote	to	leave	was	remarkable.	This	left-leaning,	small	nation,	which	benefits	
financially	 from	 EU	 membership,	 had	 long	 been	 seen	 as	 pro-European	 (Wyn	 Jones	 and	 Rumbul	
2012).	Wales	 had	 supported	 the	 UK’s	 membership	 of	 the	 European	 Economic	 Community	 in	 the	
1975	 Referendum2	 and,	 since	 this	 time,	 the	 developing	 EU	 context	 had	 served	 to	 bolster	 Wales	
financially,	 economically	 and	 also	 as	 a	 distinct	 international	 actor.	 Indeed,	 the	 EU	 has	 a	 notable	
impact	on	Wales	on	a	number	of	fronts:	legal	and	political,	cultural,	financial	and	economic.	
The	history	of	Wales’s	membership	of	the	EU	is	now	indivisible	from	the	story	of	devolution	in	the	
UK,	which	 entered	 a	 new	phase	 following	 the	 coming	 to	 power	 of	 the	UK	 Labour	Government	 in	
1997.	 Following	 a	 referendum	 in	 that	 year,	 narrowly	 in	 favour	 (50.3	 per	 cent),	 a	 devolved	Welsh	
Assembly	 was	 established.	 The	 Assembly	 and	 machinery	 of	 government	 has	 been	 in	 a	 state	 of	
constant	 development	 since	 then,	 with	 successive	 expansion	 of	 powers.	 These	 processes	 of	












Assent	 (Parliament,	 UK	 2016)	 (which	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 in	 early	 2017).	 Under	 this	 model,	 the	Welsh	
Assembly	 will	 have	 competence	 to	 legislate	 on	 all	 such	 matters	 as	 are	 not	 reserved	 to	 the	
Westminster	 Parliament.	 The	 continuing	 sovereignty	 of	 Parliament	 connects	 all	 three	 models	 of	
devolution,	though	a	constitutional	convention	operates	that	Westminster	will	not	normally	legislate	
on	a	devolved	matter	without	consent	of	the	relevant	devolved	parliament.	This	Sewel	Convention	
has	 been	 incorporated	 into	 the	 Scotland	 Act	 and	 a	 comparable	 provision	 is	 foreseen	 in	 the	 new	
Wales	 Act.	 Current	 areas	 devolved	 to	 Wales	 include	 agriculture,	 economic	 development,	 health,	
education,	 housing	 and	 the	 environment.	 Structures	 for	 policy	 coordination	 across	 the	 UK	 are	 in	
place	 (though	 their	 effectiveness	 is	 open	 to	 question),	 and	 are	 centred	 on	 Joint	 Ministerial	
Committees	 which	 operate	 against	 the	 backdrop	 of	 a	 Memorandum	 of	 Understanding.	 Public	




such,	 these	 devolved	powers	 are	 exercised	within	 a	 framework	provided	by	 EU	 law,	which	places	
both	 shaping	 and	 limiting	 effects	 on	Welsh	 law.	 Of	 course,	 the	 EU	 also	 has	 an	 impact	 on	Wales	
beyond	areas	of	devolved	competence,	and	in	some	cases	this	impact	is	quite	distinctive.	Indeed,	EU	
law	and	policy	(whether	 in	devolved	or	non-devolved	areas)	plays	out	 in	a	particular	way	 in	Wales	
given	its	size,	the	nature	of	its	key	industries	and	its	socio-economic	make-up.	Reflecting	this	distinct	
‘regional’	impact	of	the	EU	are	the	multiple	channels	through	which	the	particular	interests	of	Wales	
can	 be	 promoted	 at	 the	 EU	 level.	 The	 EU	 institutions	 themselves	 make	 provision	 for	 the	
representation	 of	 Wales.	 Wales	 has	 four	 Members	 of	 the	 European	 Parliament,	 and	 has	
representation	on	the	Committee	of	the	Regions	and	the	European	Economic	and	Social	Committee.	
There	are	also	individuals	from	Wales	and	seconded	experts	from	the	Welsh	Government	working	as	
officials	 in	 the	 EU	 institutions.	 Beyond	 this,	 Wales	 has	 established	 its	 own	 outpost	 in	 Brussels	 –	
Wales	House	–	that	seeks	to	protect	and	promote	the	interests	of	Wales	in	the	EU.	This	is	home	to	
the	 Welsh	 Government	 EU	 Office,	 the	 National	 Assembly	 for	 Wales	 EU	 Office,	 the	 Welsh	 Local	
Government	Association	(WLGA)	EU	Office,	and	the	Welsh	Higher	Education	Brussels	(WHEB)	Office.	
In	addition	to	this,	there	is	an	extensive	range	of	networks	 in	which	Wales	 is	represented,	through	












There	was	 a	 vocal	minority	who	 supported	 Leave,	 notably	 the	 seven	 recently	 installed	 UKIP	 AMs	
(new	 additions	 to	 the	 Assembly	 with	 the	 elections	 on	 5	May	 2016)	 and	 the	 leader	 of	 the	Welsh	
Conservatives,	Andrew	RT	Davies.	 The	broad	 sweep,	however,	was	 firmly	pro-EU.	 Labour	has	 long	
been	the	dominant	party	in	Wales,	both	in	the	Assembly	(currently	with	29	AMs)	and	at	Westminster	
(currently	with	 25	 out	 of	 40	Welsh	MPs).	 In	 the	 run	 up	 to	 the	 EU	 referendum,	 the	 Labour	Welsh	






EU	 would	 be	 ‘catastrophic’	 for	 Wales	 (BBC	 News	 2015).	 Plaid	 Cymru	 (the	 Party	 of	 Wales)	 also	
adopted	 a	 clear	 pro-EU	 stance.	 Furthermore,	 along	with	 the	 Scottish	 National	 Party,	 Plaid	 Cymru	
supported	 a	 devolution	 lock	 on	 the	 final	 referendum	 outcome,	 whereby	 a	 vote	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	
would	only	be	valid	if	this	result	was	returned	across	the	four	nations.	
A	particularly	 striking	 feature	of	 the	EU	Referendum	 in	Wales	 is	 the	clear	disconnect	between	 the	
electorate’s	 vote	 to	 leave	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 overwhelming	 support	 for	 the	 UK’s	 continued	 EU	
membership	 from	 the	 political	 elite	 and	 sectoral	 interest	 groups	 across	 Wales.	 Of	 the	 22	 local	
authority	 areas	 in	 Wales,	 17	 voted	 Leave.	 These	 included	 those	 areas	 represented	 by	 the	 First	
Minister	 Carwyn	 Jones	 and	 Plaid	 Cymru	 Leader	 Leanne	 Wood.	 A	 number	 of	 factors	 have	 been	
advanced	to	explain	this	contrast	between	the	political	classes	and	the	Welsh	public	in	their	support	
for	 the	EU	 (see	O’Hagan	2016;	Wyn-Jones	2016).	 First,	 there	are	particular	 challenges	attached	 to	
disseminating	a	distinct	Welsh	narrative	about	EU	membership.	In	part,	this	is	due	to	the	dominance	
of	 London-based	 media	 in	 Wales.	 These	 media	 outlets	 are	 broadly	 insensitive	 to	 territorial	
differentiation	within	the	UK,	therefore	providing	no	room	for	addressing	the	specific	case	of	Wales	
and	 the	EU.	 Secondly,	 the	EU	Referendum	came	hot	on	 the	heels	of	 the	Assembly	elections;	 they	
were	held	only	 seven	weeks	apart.	Therefore,	 there	was	a	 certain	amount	of	 fatigue	amongst	 the	
political	activists,	who	had	invested	heavily	in	campaigning	around	the	National	Assembly	elections	
and	who	were	simply	too	tired	to	begin	campaigning	anew	with	the	same	level	of	vigour.	Finally,	it	is	
considered	 that	 (much	 like	 the	 Leave	 result	 across	 England)	many	 voters	 in	Wales	were	 casting	 a	
vote	against	the	status	quo.	Whilst	key	arguments	of	the	Leave	campaign	resonated	amongst	Welsh	
voters	 (such	 as	 immigration	 and	 budget	 contributions),	 to	 some	 extent	 the	 EU	 was	 seen	 as	 the	
embodiment	 of	 the	 distant,	 unaccountable	 political	 elite	 and	 this	was	 a	 key	 factor	 in	 their	 voting	
choice.		
Central	to	much	of	the	pro-EU,	Wales-specific	narrative	has	been	the	financial	and	economic	impact	
of	 EU	 membership.	 Financially,	 unlike	 the	 UK	 as	 a	 whole,	 Wales	 is	 a	 net	 recipient	 of	 EU	 funds,	
predominantly	 through	 Common	 Agricultural	 Policy	 (CAP)	 payments	 and	 European	 Structural	 and	
Investment	 Funds	 (ESIF).	 A	 crucial	 feature	 of	 these	 funds	 is	 that	 they	 are	 ring-fenced,	 and	 hence	
guaranteed,	 at	 the	 level	 of	 devolved	 administrations,	 for	 a	 seven-year	 period.	 The	 issue	 of	 EU	
funding	 is	 discussed	 further	 below.	 Finally,	 looking	 to	 economic	 considerations,	 the	 Single	Market	
has	a	particular	significance	for	Wales.	In	part,	this	is	because	Wales	is	a	small	nation	and	has	used	
its	 membership	 of	 the	 Single	 Market	 as	 a	 key	 selling	 point	 to	 secure	 Foreign	 Direct	 Investment.	
Furthermore,	unlike	the	UK	as	a	whole,	Wales	is	recorded	as	a	net	exporter	of	goods	to	the	EU	(HM	




The	decision	of	 voters	 in	 some	of	 the	poorest	 areas	 of	Wales	 to	 vote	 Leave	 immediately	 led	 to	 a	
flurry	of	media	coverage	asking	why,	in	Wales,	the	‘turkeys	had	voted	for	Christmas’	(O’Hagan	2016;	
Wyn-Jones	2016).	Wales	after	all	enjoys	far	higher	levels	of	EU	funding	than	other	UK	regions	and	as	
a	result,	whilst	 the	UK	overall	 is	a	net	contributor	 to	the	EU	budget,	Wales	 is	a	net	beneficiary.4	A	
large	part	of	 this	 funding	comes	 through	 the	EU’s	Cohesion	Policy.	This	policy	originated	 from	the	
recognition	that	the	benefits	of	the	Single	Market	were	not	distributed	evenly	across	the	EU,	and	a	









EUR	by	 the	end	of	 the	2014-2020	programming	period	 (Woolford	and	Hunt	2016b).	Whilst	overall	
this	contribution	may	appear	minimal,	representing	only	0.4	per	cent	of	Welsh	GDP,	the	majority	of	
funding	 is	 concentrated	 in	 the	 ‘less-developed	 region’	 of	 West	 Wales	 and	 the	 Valleys.	 Wales	
comprises	two	separate	regions	for	EU	funding	purposes,	and,	with	a	GDP	below	75	per	cent	of	the	
EU	average,	West	Wales	and	the	Valleys	qualifies	for	the	highest	levels	of	EU	funding.6	This	suggests	
that	 a	 very	 significant	 impact	 could	 be	 felt	 locally	 in	 eligible	 areas.	 The	 amounts	 received	 by	 the	




of	 Brexit	 (Welsh	Government	 2016a).	 Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 current	 Conservative	Government	
made	it	clear	 in	the	run	up	to	the	referendum,	that	there	would	be	no	guaranteed	replacement	of	
any	shortfall	in	EU	receipts	to	Wales	in	the	event	of	Brexit	(BBC	News	2016a;	Woolford	2016),	he	has	
continued	 to	argue	 for	a	 ‘full	guarantee’	 that	 funding	will	 continue	 for	existing	EU	programmes	 to	
2023.7	 Some	 assurance	 of	 continuity	 in	 the	 short	 term	 has	 been	 provided.8	 One	 of	 the	 biggest	
vulnerabilities	in	relation	to	ESIF	financial	allocations	and	their	potential	loss	to	Wales	is,	of	course,	
the	 timing	 and	 content	 of	 Article	 50	 withdrawal	 negotiations.	 With	 the	 triggering	 of	 Article	 50	
expected	 in	 March	 2017	 and	 a	 two-year	 withdrawal	 process	 provided	 for	 in	 the	 Treaties,	 UK	
membership	 of	 the	 EU	 will	 end	 in	 March	 2019.	 It	 is	 reasonable	 to	 assume	 that	 an	 end	 to	 EU	
budgetary	contributions	is	likely	to	coincide	with	the	withdrawal	of	ESIF	allocations	to	the	UK	which	
could	 lose	 Wales	 more	 than	 860m	 EUR	 of	 the	 2014-2020	 allocations.	 Potential	 future	 funding	
opportunities	from	the	policy	post-2020	will	also	be	missed	out	on9	as	will	funding	under	a	number	
of	other	related	instruments.10	







wholly	 successful,	 funding	 projects	with	 ‘questionable	 strategies	 and	woolly	 outcomes’.	 Repeated	




and	 its	 devolved	 government	 simply	 to	 repackage	 existing	 development	 approaches	 and	 policy	
priorities	 into	 ‘standard	EU	fare’	designed	to	absorb	European	funding	(Morgan	1997;	Pugh	2014).	
The	 higher	 funding	 levels	 in	 Wales	 have	 not	 led	 to	 greater	 performance	 or	 results	 against	 key	
economic	indicators	such	as	jobs	created	and	new	businesses	(Hunt,	Lavery,	Vittery	and	Berry	2016).	
In	 Wales,	 projects	 funded	 under	 the	 ERDF	 are	 estimated	 to	 have	 created	 36,640	 new	 jobs	 and	
11,900	new	businesses	in	the	2007-13	period.	The	equivalent	figures	for	Scotland,	where	the	Remain	
vote	 triumphed	 in	every	 local	 authority	 area,	 are	44,311	and	17,474	 respectively,	despite	 receipts	
amounting	to	36	per	cent	of	those	to	Wales.11	Questions	can	be	asked	as	to	whether	interventions	
that	 resulted	 in	 job	and	business	 creation	would	have	been	more	 relevant	 and	visible	 to	 targeted	
communities	 than	 the	 larger	 infrastructure	 projects	 that	 tend	 to	 be	 favoured	 under	 the	 Welsh	
programmes	(BBC	One	Wales).	The	choice	of	 intervention	is	strongly	correlated	with	the	 impact	of	





infrastructure	 investment	 (Becker	 2012).	 New	 models	 of	 delivery	 such	 as	 Community-Led	 Local	
Development	 (CLLD)	 that	 look	 to	 boost	 the	 impact	 of	 EU	 funding	 at	 the	 local	 level	 through	









Carwyn	 Jones	 has	 called	 for	 a	 major	 and	 immediate	 revision	 of	 the	 Barnett	 Formula	 (Welsh	
Government	2016b).	UK	and	Welsh	economic	development	strategy	and	funding,	highly	aligned	with	




Responses	 from	Westminster	 suggest	 that	 serious	 policy	 overhaul	 is	 likely.	 This	 could	 mean	 that	
regions	 are	 designated	 differently	 and	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 policy,	 eligible	 activities,	 favoured	





from	Westminster	 and	Whitehall	 to	 Cardiff	 Bay.	 This	 has	 seen	 an	 expansion	 in	 both	 the	 range	 of	
policy	areas	devolved,	and	also	in	the	tools	and	techniques	available	to	the	Assembly	to	act.	Initially,	
on	the	coming	into	force	of	the	1998	Government	of	Wales	Act,	the	powers	granted	to	the	Assembly	
extended	only	 to	passing	secondary	 legislation	under	primary	acts	of	 the	Westminster	Parliament.	
This	was	in	contrast	to	the	situation	in	Scotland,	which	had	gained	primary	law	making	powers	for	its	
Parliament.	 These	 powers	 have	 been	 developed	 such	 that,	 by	 2011,	 the	Welsh	Assembly	 had	 the	
competence	 to	 adopt	 primary	 laws	 across	 twenty	 devolved	 areas,	 supplementing	more	 extensive	
executive	 powers	 held	 by	 the	Welsh	 Government.	 These	 powers	 run	 alongside	 those	 retained	 in	
London	to	 legislate	 for	Wales,	whether	as	part	of	UK-wide	 legislation	or	 through	more	 territorially	
targeted	measures,	subject	to	the	Sewel	Convention.13	
Amongst	the	areas	devolved	to	Wales	have	been	some	areas	which	have	been	heavily	Europeanised,	




formed	with	 the	EU,	no	 longer	apply.	This	 could	 then	see	a	 transfer	of	 significant	 ‘real’	powers	 to	
Wales	 (and	 the	 other	 devolved	 administrations),	 taking	 them	 beyond	 the	 de	 facto	 powers	 of	
implementation	 defining	 their	 position	 so	 far	 –	 and,	 in	 those	 terms	 a	 ‘win’.	 However,	 the	 actual	
scope	for	the	exercise	of	those	powers	may	be	more	restricted	than	first	presumed.		
To	 take	 the	 example	 of	 the	 environment,	much	 EU	 environmental	 law	 is	 contained	 in	 directives,	
which	require	implementation	by	state	authorities.	These	have	been	transposed	both	at	UK	or	Wales	






Welsh	 approach	has	 emerged	 in	 a	 number	 of	 areas.	 There	 is,	 for	 example,	 a	 statutory	 duty	 upon	
Welsh	ministers	to	promote	sustainable	development	in	all	their	business	and	ensure	a	scheme	for	
its	 implementation	 (Government	of	 the	UK	2008),	 further	enhanced	 through	 the	Wellbeing	Power	
(ibid),	 which	 authorises	Welsh	ministers	 to	 do	 anything	 they	 consider	 appropriate	 to	 promote	 or	
improve	the	‘economic,	social	and	environmental	wellbeing	of	Wales’	(see	also	Government	of	the	












negative	 consequences	 associated	 with	 too	 much	 diversity	 or	 divergence	 from	 neighbouring	
jurisdictions	 in	 the	 area	 of	 environmental	 policy,	 whether	 at	 UK	 level	 or	 between	 the	 devolved	
administrations.	 For	 example,	 energy	policy	 could	be	problematic	 in	 the	 case	of	Brexit	 due	 to	 the	
interconnections	across	different	national	markets.	Furthermore,	a	number	of	requirements	within	
this	 field	 of	 law	 stem	 from	other	 international	 legal	 obligations	 to	which	 the	UK	 is	 party.	Wales’s	
freedom	 of	 action	 could	 thus	 also	 be	 constrained	 by	 obligations	 arising	 from	 international	 law.	
Finally,	there	are	very	real	questions	around	Wales’s	capacity	to	absorb	swathes	of	additional	policy-
making	 responsibility.	 This	 includes	 not	 only	 infrastructure	 and	 institutional	 aspects,	 but	 also,	 as	






EU	membership	and	conventionally	understood	 to	be	pro-European –	voted	Leave. At	 the	 time	of	
writing,	 much	 hangs	 in	 the	 balance.	 What	 is	 certain,	 however,	 is	 that	 the	 UK’s	 exit	 from	 the	




developed	 in	 the	context	of	 the	UK’s	EU	membership.	Brexit	 in	Wales	will	play	out	along	multiple	





will	be	able	 to	develop	 its	own	 legal,	policy	and	 regulatory	 regimes,	 free	 from	the	constraints	and	
limitations	 of	 EU	 law	 (although	 still	 subject	 to	 other	 international	 obligations).	 On	 the	 other,	 this	






its	 policy	 territory	 from	 the	 centralising	 forces	 of	Westminster.	 The	 story	 of	 Brexit	 in	Wales	 is	 far	






















good	value	 for	money	and	close	alignment	with	domestic	 strategic	priorities.	There	 is	as	yet	 little	 clarity	as	 to	how	that	
would	be	measured	or	defined.	
9	Recognising	that	the	level	of	funding	available	would	likely	be	reduced	from	the	current	programming	period.	
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